Abstract. Identity-based encryption is a very convenient tool to avoid key management. Recipient-privacy is also a major concern nowadays. To combine both, anonymous identity-based encryption has been proposed. This paper extends this notion to stronger adversaries (the authority itself). We discuss this new notion, together with a new kind of non-malleability with respect to the identity, for several existing schemes. Interestingly enough, such a new anonymity property has an independent application to password-authenticated key exchange. We thus come up with a new generic framework for password-authenticated key exchange, and a concrete construction based on pairings.
Introduction
Motivation. The idea of using identities instead of public keys in order to avoid the (costly) use of certificates comes from Shamir [19] . He indeed suggested Identity-based Encryption (IBE), that would allow a user to encrypt a message using any string, that would specify the recipient, as encryption parameter, such that this recipient only can decrypt the ciphertext. Identity-based cryptography thus provides this interesting feature that one does not need authenticated public keys. Key managament is made simpler. Note however that a drawback is an authority that is required to generate the private keys for the users, according to their identities. This authority thus has the ability to decrypt any ciphertext. Privacy cannot be achieved with respect to this authority. Nevertheless, privacy of the plaintext is not the unique goal in cryptography, with encryption schemes. Privacy of the recipient may also be a requirement. Such a key-privacy notion has already been defined in the public-key setting in [3] . It has more recently been extended to the identity-based setting in [1] , under the notion of anonymity. However, the security model in this IBE setting still trusts the authority. Whereas trusting the authority is intrinsic for privacy of the plaintext, it is not for the privacy of the recipient: a stronger anonymity notion is possible, with respect to the authority, but is it achievable for practical IBE?
For efficiency reasons, the use of Key Encapsulation Mechanisms KEM have been shown as a preferable approach [21] . It consists in generating an ephemeral key and an encrypted version of the latter. The ephemeral key is thereafter used with a Data Encryption Method DEM to encrypt the message. In such a context, we are interested in the semantic security of the ephemeral key, and the anonymity of the recipient. In the identity-based context, Bentahar et al. [7] defined Identity-based Key Encapsulation Mechanisms IB-KEM. An anonymity notion with respect to the authority would then be an interesting feature. Interestingly enough, this notion of anonymity with respect to the authority might have side applications. One of them is PAKE [6] , for password-authenticated key exchange. Such a protocol allows two players to establish a private channel, using a short secret as a sole authentication means. The latter is thus subject to exhaustive search, but such a short secret is very convenient for human beings.
Even if recipient-anonymity had already been addressed for public-key encryption [3] in 2001, anonymity for IBE has been proposed recently by Abdalla et al. [1] , but as a simple extension of the previous public-key setting definition. In 2006, Gentry [16] and Boyen and Waters [12] presented the first anonymous IBE schemes without random oracles.
Our contributions. As already noticed in [1] , anonymity might have some side applications to searchable encryption. In this paper, we deal with anonymity for IB-KEM, even with respect to the authority, the so-called Key Anonymity with respect to the Authority and denoted KwrtA-Anonymity: we first provide a formal security model, and then we discuss this security notion with existing schemes. We also consider a new non-malleability notion for the identity, that we call identity-based non-malleability: if one encrypts a message (or a key) for user U , one has no idea about the value obtained by another user U ′ , whatever the relation between U and U ′ (or the identities) is.
Thereafter, we show that these security notions can also have side applications to password-authenticated key exchange. Such a KwrtA-anonymous and identity-based non-malleability IB-KEM scheme can indeed be plugged into a password-authenticated two-party key exchange protocol, in the same vein as the IPAKE construction [14] did with trapdoor hard-to-invert group isomorphisms. Our security result holds in a stronger security model than usual (with an adaptive selection of passive and active attacks, as in [18] ), but the construction still assumes the random-oracle model [5] , as in [14] .
Eventually, we provide an IB-KEM, that is both KwrtA-anonymous and identity-based non-malleable, in addition to the full-identity semantic security, against chosen-plaintext adversaries. This thus leads to a new password-authenticated two-party key exchange protocol.
Anonymous Identity-Based Encryption
Anonymity for public-key encryption schemes has first been introduced by Bellare et al. [3] , under the key privacy security notion, and has been extended to identity-based encryption by Abdalla et al. [1] .
In these papers, anonymity meant that even if the adversary chooses a message and two identities (or two public keys), and the challenger encrypts the message with one of the identities (or keys), the adversary cannot guess which one has actually been involved in the computation. This notion is quite strong for public-key encryption, but not that strong in the identity-based setting since it does not capture anonymity with respect to the authority that knows the master secret key, and even chooses the public parameters PK.
Unfortunately, the previous definitions cannot be trivially extended: the adversary can easily break anonymity if he knows the expected plaintext, and just hesitates between two identities, since he can decrypt any ciphertext. Anonymity can only be expected against the server if the plaintexts follow a nontrivial distribution. Since we will deal with key-encapsulation mechanisms, this non-trivial distribution is already implicit for the ephemeral keys.
This enhanced security notion will be called Key Anonymity with respect to the Authority and denoted KwrtA-Anonymity. This section defines precisely this notion for identity-based key encapsulation mechanisms.
Identity-Based Encryption and Key Encapsulation Mechanisms
We first review the definitions of identity-based encryption, and more specifically of identity-based key encapsulation mechanisms [7] . In the following, we assume that identities are bit strings in a dictionary Dic.
Definition 1 (Identity-Based Encryption). An IBE scheme is specified by four algorithms:
Setup IBE (1 λ ). Takes as input a security parameter λ. It outputs the public parameters PK, as well as a master secret key MK. Extract IBE (MK, ID). Takes as input the master secret key MK, and the identity ID of the user. It outputs the user's decryption key usk. Encrypt IBE (PK, ID, M ). Takes as input the public parameter PK, the identity of the recipient, and a message M to be encrypted. It outputs a ciphertext. Decrypt IBE (usk, c). Takes as input the user's decryption key and a ciphertext c. It outputs the decryption or ⊥, if the ciphertext is not valid.
In [20] Shoup proposed a more efficient framework for public-key encryption, the so-called KEM/DEM, for key encapsulation mechanism/data encapsulation method. More recently, Bentahar et al. [7] extended this concept to the identity-based setting, and therefore proposed some constructions of IB-KEM semantically secure. We will use the following formalism:
Definition 2 (Identity-Based Key Encapsulation Mechanism). An IB-KEM scheme is specified by the following four algorithms:
. Takes as input a security parameter λ. It outputs the public parameters PK, as well as a master secret key MK. Extract IBK (MK, ID). Takes as input the master secret key MK and an identity ID of the user. It outputs the user's decryption key usk. Encaps IBK (PK, ID). Takes as input the public parameters PK and the identity of the recipient. It outputs a pair (K, c), where K is the ephemeral session key and c is the encapsulation of that key. Decaps IBK (usk, c). Takes as input the user's decryption key usk and a ciphertext c. It outputs the key K encapsulated in c or ⊥, if the ciphertext is not valid. We also formally define the function Decaps IBK (ID, c), which takes as input a user identity ID and a ciphertext c. It first extracts the decryption key usk associated to ID, and then decapsulates c under usk.
We first review the notion of semantic security for IB-KEM, then we deal with anonymity, and an additional security notion, that we call identity-based non-malleability.
Security Notions
We directly describe the security notions for identity-based key encapsulation mechanisms, but one can easily derive them for identity-based encryption.
Semantic Security. The semantic security formalizes the privacy of the key. The security game, in the strongest security model (i.e. chosen-ciphertext and full-identity attacks) is the following one:
Setup : The challenger runs the Setup IBK algorithm on input 1 λ to obtain the public parameters PK, and the master secret key MK. It publishes PK. Find stage: The adversary A adaptively issues the following queries:
-Extract query on input an ID: The challenger runs the Extract algorithm on input (MK, ID), and provides the associated decryption key usk. -Decaps query on input an ID and a ciphertext c: The challenger first extracts the decryption key for ID, and then decrypts the ciphertext c with this key. It outputs the resulting ephemeral key, or ⊥.
A outputs a target identity ID * , on which no Extract-query has been asked. Challenge: The challenger randomly gets (K 0 , c * ) ← Encaps IBK (PK, ID * ) and (K 1 , c ′ ) ← Encaps IBK (PK, ID * ). It flips a bit b and outputs (K b , c * ). Guess stage: The adversary can issue the same queries as in the Find stage, with the restriction that no Extract-query on input ID * and no Decaps-query on input (ID * , c * ) can be asked. The adversary finally outputs its guess b ′ ∈ {0, 1} for b.
We then define the advantage of A in breaking the Semantic Security of an IB-KEM scheme with its ability in deciding whether it actually received the real ephemeral key associated to c * or a random one. We denote this security notion by IND, which can thereafter be combined with various oracle accesses, in order to define selective/full-identity and chosen plaintext/ciphertext attacks. More formally, we want the advantage below, to be negligible:
In the following, we will need a very weak notion, that we call weak semantic security, during which attack that adversary has to choose in advance the target identity ID * (selective-ID), and has no oracle access at all: no Decaps queries, and no Extract queries. Anonymity. Anonymity against IBE means that for a chosen plaintext, and given a ciphertext c encrypted under ID 0 or ID 1 of adversary's choice, the adversary should not be able to decide which identity has been involved. With an appropriate DEM encryption scheme, the key encapsulation anonymity version can be defined as follows:
The challenger runs Setup IBK on input 1 λ to obtain the public parameters PK, and the master secret key MK. It publishes PK. Find stage: The adversary A adaptively issues Extract and Decaps queries. A outputs two identities ID 0 , ID 1 , on which no Extract-query has been asked before. Challenge: The challenger randomly selects b ∈ {0, 1} and gets an encapsulated pair (K * , c * ) under ID b . It returns (K * , c * ). Guess stage: The adversary can issue the same queries as in the Find stage, subject to the restriction that no Extract-query is allowed to be asked on ID 0 or ID 1 , and no Decaps-query can be asked on input (ID 0 , c * ), or (ID 1 , c * ). It finally outputs its guess b ′ ∈ {0, 1} for b.
We say that an IB-KEM scheme provides key-anonymity if the advantage of A in deciding which identity is actually involved in the above experiment is negligible:
As already noticed, this anonymity notion does not provide any security with respect to the authority, since the above security notion assumes that the adversary has no idea about MK. KwrtA-Anonymity. We therefore enhance the previous security model, in order to consider the authority as a possible adversary. However, it is clear that given (K * , c * ), the authority can check the involved ID. We thus truncate the input to c * only:
Find stage: The adversary generates (valid, see below) public parameters PK. A outputs PK and two identities ID 0 , ID 1 . Challenge : The challenger randomly selects b ∈ {0, 1}, and generates a ciphertext for ID b , (K * , c * ) ← Encaps IBK (PK, ID b ). It outputs c * . Guess stage: The adversary finally outputs its guess b ′ ∈ {0, 1}.
We say that an IB-KEM scheme provides Key Anonymity with respect to the Authority (denoted KwrtAAnonymity) if the advantage of A in deciding which identity is involved in the experiment above is negligible:
We emphasis that in the above experiment, the adversary has to generate valid public parameters PK. Note that against KwrtA-Anonymity (vs. anonymity), on the one hand, the new adversary may know the master key MK, but on the other hand, it must make its decision from c * only. Therefore, these two security notions are not really comparable. Furthermore, since the adversary generates PK, one has to be able to check the honest generation. In some cases, PK is a truly random value, without redundancy; in some other cases, appropriate redundancy should be proven. We thus define an additional algorithm:
Valid IBK (PK). Takes as input the public parameters PK, and checks whether they satisfy the required properties.
Identity-based Non-Malleability. In the application we will study later, a new security notion for identity-based encryption will appear. It basically states that when one sends a ciphertext to a user ID, one has no idea how user ID ′ will decrypt it, even for identities chosen by the adversary. This means that when one computes an encapsulation, it provides an ephemeral session key with a unique recipient, and not several secret keys with several partners. We define the identity-based non-malleability game as follows:
Setup: The challenger runs Setup IBK on input 1 λ to obtain the public parameters PK, and the master secret key MK. It publishes PK. Attack: The adversary A adaptively issues Extract and Decaps queries, and outputs a ciphertext c, and two pairs (K 0 , ID 0 ), and (K 1 , ID 1 ).
The adversary wins this game if the two formal equalities hold:
We thus define the success of A in breaking the Identity-based Non-Malleability of an IB-KEM scheme by:
Note that this security notion is for a normal user, and not for the authority itself. Indeed, it would clearly be incompatible with KwrtA-Anonymity.
Anonymous and Non-Malleable IB-KEM
Since the first practical IBE schemes, new features, and new efficient/security criteria have been defined. An efficient anonymous IBE with a tight security proof in the standard model is one of the open problems. In this section, we first review some candidates, and then propose a new scheme that satisfies all the above requirements: semantic security, various anonymity notions and identity-based non-malleability.
Backgrounds on Pairings
Let G 1 and G 2 be two cyclic groups of large prime order p. We suppose that these two groups are equipped with a pairing, i.e. a non-degenerated and efficiently computable bilinear mapê :
In the following, we use multiplicative notation for G 1 and
, for all a, b ∈ Z p , and any g 1 ∈ G 1 and g ∈ G 2 . For the sake of generality, we consider the asymmetric case, where G 1 = G 2 , but most of the schemes below also apply in the symmetric setting, where
Diffie-Hellman Assumptions
The co-CDH-Problem. Let g 1 and g 2 two generators of G 1 and G 2 respectively. We define the co-Diffie-
We define the success probability of A in breaking the co-CDH G 1 ,G 2 -problem as:
Note that when G 1 = G 2 = G, the co-CDH G,G -problem is exactly the usual Computational Diffie-Hellman Problem in G, which can still be difficult. However, the decisional version is easy, granted the pairing.
We can indeed define the co-
The Common co-CDH-Problem. Given two elements, it is simple to complete a co-CDH-quadruple (g 1 , g 2 , u, v). However, finding two such quadruples with constraints may not be simple. We thus define a new problem, called the Common co-CDH-Problem, as follows: Given g, h ∈ G, and V ∈ G T , output
We define the success of A in breaking the Common-co-CDH G,ê -Problem as:
The CBDH-Problem. Diffie-Hellman variants have been proposed in groups equipped with pairings, and namely in the symmetric case: let g be a generator of G. We define the Bilinear Diffie-Hellman value of g x , g y , g z , for x, y, z ∈ Z p , in base g, the element V =ê(g, g) xyz ∈ G T . The CBDH G,ê problem can be formalized as follows:
We define the success probability of A in breaking the CBDH G,ê -problem as:
The DBDH-Problem. The decisional version can then be intractable too: given g, X = g x , Y = g y , Z = g z ∈ G, and V ∈ G T , decide whether V =ê(g, g) xyz , or not. We define the advantage of A in breaking the DBDH G,ê -problem as:
The Successive-Power Version. For our scheme to be semantically secure, we will need a stronger variant of the above DBDH problem, given access to a sequence of powers, similarly to the Strong DiffieHellman problem [9] : More precisely, given g, g x , g y , g z , and g z/x , g z/x 2 , . . . , g z/x q , as well as V , from some V ∈ G T , where q is a parameter, decide whether V =ê(g, g) xyz , or a random element. We define the advantage of A in breaking the q-SP-DBDH G,ê -assumption as:
.
It is clear that such a sequence of powers should not provide much information to the adversary. And thus, for any polynomial-time adversary A, the above advantage is negligible. We provide the proofs that our two new problems are intractable for generic adversaries in the Appendix B.
Previous IBE Schemes
Let us review several IBE, and see which properties they satisfy. For the sake of simplicity, for all of them, we review the key encapsulation mechanisms. In several schemes, we will need a deterministic map F from identities onto the group G, possibly with parameter PK.
The Boneh-Franklin Scheme [10] . In this scheme, MK = s R ← Z p and PK = g s . The map F (ID) is independent of PK. This is a function onto G, modeled as a random oracle in the security analysis. The ciphertext c = g r ∈ G corresponds to the key K =ê(F (ID), PK) r = BDH g (PK, c, F (ID)) =ê(usk ID , c),
It is quite similar to the ElGamal encryption, and thus the semantic security relies on the DBDH G,ê , but against chosen-plaintext attacks only, in the random oracle model, even with access to the Extractquery, which is similar to the Boneh-Lynn-Shacham signature [11] (secure against chosen-message attacks under the CDH G problem).
Since the ciphertext is totally independent of the identity, this scheme is KwrtA-anonymous, in the information-theoretical sense. Nevertheless, the basic anonymity is similar to the semantic security, and relies on the DBDH G,ê . However, since the ciphertext does not involve the identity, it is easy to break the identity-based non-malleability: knowing r and c = g r , one easily computes K = BDH g (PK, c, F (ID)) = e(F (ID), PK) r , for any ID of ones choice.
The Boneh-Boyen Scheme [8] . In this scheme, α
if one gets usk ID = (g r , MK · F PK (ID) r ), for any r R ← Z p . As above, the semantic security relies on the DBDH G,ê assumption, in the standard model, but against selective-ID chosen-plaintext attacks, even with access to the Extract-query (the underlying signature scheme is selective-forgery secure against chosen-message attacks under the CBDH assumption).
However, because of the redundancy in the ciphertext, which matches with one identity only, this scheme is not anonymous: one just has to check, for a candidate ID, and a ciphertext c = (c 1 , c 2 ), whether (g, F PK (ID), c 1 , c 2 ) is a Diffie-Hellman tuple, byê(c 1 , F PK (ID)) ? =ê(c 2 , g). Since this attack did not need a candidate key K, a fortiori, this scheme is not KwrtA-anonymous.
On the other hand, since the ciphertext focuses to a specific recipient, one has no idea how another ID ′ would decrypt it, because of its randomness r ′ in the decryption key: for wrong user, with usk
, and r ′ totally random. Therefore, it is identity-based non-malleable in the informationtheoretical sense. The Gentry Scheme [16] . In 2006, two schemes have been proposed, with provable anonymity. Gentry's scheme is one of them: g, h
is the encapsulation of K =ê(g, h) s , and thus, setting (usk 1 , usk 2 ) = (r, (hg −r ) 1/(α−ID) ), for any r
The scheme is semantically secure and anonymous against chosen plaintext attacks, even with access to the Extract-query, under the truncated decisional augmented bilinear Diffie-Hellman exponent assumption (see [16] for details).
However, the scheme is not KwrtA-anonymous, since using bilinear maps combined with the redundancy inside the ciphertext provides a test for any target identity ID ′ , since knowing α, A can test whether
Since the ciphertext is specific to the recipient, A has no idea how an other
is a random element in G T . Thus, the scheme is identity-based non-malleable in the information-theoretical sense.
The Boyen-Waters scheme [13] . Boyen and Waters proposed another provably anonymous scheme:
ω, t 1 , t 2 , t 3 and t 4 R ← Z p are set to be the master secret key and
are the public parameters PK, with g a random generator of G and g 0 , g 1 R ← G. The map F PK is defined by F PK (ID) = g 0 · ID. To encrypt a key, one chooses a random s ∈ Z p and sets K = Ω s , its encapsulation has the following form:
, and c 4 = v s 2 4 . To decapsulate the key, one has to compute
with usk ID = (usk 0 , usk 1 , usk 2 , usk 3 , usk 4 ), where:
for any r 1 , r 2 R ← Z p . This scheme is semantically secure under DBDH G,ê , and anonymous under the decision linear assumption (we do not give more details since this scheme is totally different from ours below. The reader is refereed to [13] ). However, it is not KwrtA-anonymous: since knowing the master key and given a ciphertext c = (c 0 , c 1 , c 2 , c 3 , c 4 ), one can decide for a target identity whether c 0 , c 1 , c 2 or/and c 0 , c 3 , c 4 is a linear tuple in basis v 0 , v 1 , v 2 and v 0 , v 3 , v 4 respectively.
Since the key is completely independent of the identity and c 0 is determined by the identity (among other elements), the same argument than for the two previous schemes holds: it is identity-based nonmalleable in an information-theoretically sense.
Note that for all the above schemes, the public parameters consist of independent elements in appropriate groups. The validity check Valid IBK (PK) is thus trivial.
Our Scheme
None of the previous schemes satisfies both KwrtA-anonymity and identity-based non-malleability. In this section, we describe our scheme, and show that it achieves all the security properties: semantic security, anonymity, KwrtA-anonymity and identity-based non-malleability. For the sake of simplicity, we use a symmetric pairing:.
Setup IBK . The setup algorithm chooses two random generators g, h ∈ G, and a random exponent ω ∈ Z p .
It keeps this exponent as the master key MK = ω. The corresponding system parameters are:
). It defines the identity-function:
Note that, as above, the public parameters consist of independent elements in appropriate groups. The validity check Valid IBK (PK) is thus trivial. Extract IBK (MK, ID). To issue a private key for identity ID, the key extraction authority computes the private key, usk ID = h 1/(ω+ID) . Encaps IBK (PK, ID). In order to generate an ephemeral key with an identity ID, the algorithm chooses a random exponent r ∈ Z p , and creates the ciphertext as: c = F (ID) r , that corresponds to the key K =ê(g, h) r . Decaps IBK (usk ID , c). The decryption algorithm extracts the ephemeral key K from a ciphertext c by computing: K =ê(usk ID , c).
Correctness. Let us check the decryption process:
Semantic Security. It is worth to precise that we do not require to be able to simulate any oracle for making use of IB-KEM schemes in the next section. The weak semantic security will be enough:
Theorem 3. The weak semantic security of our scheme (under selective-ID, chosen-plaintext and noidentity attacks) relies on the DBDH G,ê -problem, in the standard model.
Proof. Given u, A = u a , B = u b , C = u c , and V ∈ G T the input to the DBDH G,ê -Problem, and the target identity ID * , we set g = A = u a , h = C = u c = g c/a , g 1 = u t · A −ID * = u t−aID * , and c = B. This implicitly
u t , and the randomness r of the challenge ciphertext c = F PK (ID * ) r = u tr = u b = B is r = b/t. The corresponding encapsulated key should thus be
By letting (V 1/t , c) be the output of the challenger, an adversary able to break the semantic security (without Extract-queries) helps us to decide whether V is the Bilinear Diffie-Hellman value or not.
⊓ ⊔
In order to show the usual semantic security (under full-ID, but chosen-plaintext attacks), we have to be able to simulate the Extract-oracle, which thus requires additional inputs. But first, we modify a little bit the scheme, by using H(ID), instead of ID in the above description, where H is a random oracle [5] onto Z p .
Theorem 4. The semantic security of our scheme (by using H(ID), instead of ID) under full-ID and chosen-plaintext (no Decaps queries) relies on the successive-power version, in the random oracle model. /a i , for i = 1, . . . , q, and V ∈ G T the input to the q-SP-DBDH G,ê -problem, we first compute {V i =ê(u, u) bc/a i } i=0...q , since V 0 =ê(B, C), and V i =ê(B, C i ), for i = 1, . . . , q. Then, we set g = A = u a and g 1 = u t · A −x * , for randomly chosen t, x * R ← Z p . This implicitly defines MK = t/a − x * . We also choose random elements x 1 , . . . , x q R ← Z * p , and set P (X) = (tX + x i ), a polynomial of degree q, where the number of random oracle queries is q + 1. We then set h = C P (1/a) = u cP (1/a) , which can be easily computed granted C, C 1 , . . . , C q .
First, all the random oracle queries will be answered by an x * + x i , or x * (for a unique randomly chosen query): we hope to assign x * to H(ID * ), the target identity, which happens with probability 1/q. Let us assume this situation:
-By definition, as above,
-For all the other identities, H(ID j ) = x j , and then usk j can be computed as
where P j is a polynomial of degree q − 1. Then usk j can be easily computed granted C, C 1 , . . . , C q−1 . Hence the simulation of the Extract-oracle.
As above, the challenge ciphertext is set c = B = u b = F PK (ID * ) r for r = b/t. The corresponding encapsulated key should thus be
Let us expand P (X) = i=q i=0 p i X i , and then
In the random case, the same computation leads to a totally random key (note that p 0 = x i = 0 mod p). Then, by letting (
i−1 , c) be the output of the challenger, an adversary able to break the semantic security helps us to decide whether V is the Bilinear Diffie-Hellman value or not. We thus break the q-SP-DBDH G,ê -problem.
⊓ ⊔ Anonymity. The usual anonymity notion relies on the same assumption as the semantic security. Since the ciphertext consists of c = F (ID) r , a random element in G, whatever the identity ID. It is thus clearly KwrtA-anonymous, in the information-theoretical sense.
Theorem 5. Our scheme is unconditionally KwrtA-anonymous. Idendity-based Non-Malleability. Let us consider the ciphertext c, and its decryption with respect to ID i for i ∈ {0, 1}. In the following, r i is formally defined by c = F (ID i ) r i , and K i =ê(g, h) r i . Thus, the identity-based non-malleability relies on the intractability of finding c, {ID i , K i }, with ID 0 = ID 1 such that r i = logê (g,h) (K i ) = log F (ID i ) (c). This thus leads to a solution of the Common co-CDH-Problem.
Theorem 6. The identity-based non-malleability of our scheme relies on the Common co-CDH-Problem in groups G and G T .
IBK − PAKE: Our PAKE Protocol
The previous sections focused on identity-based key encapsulation mechanisms, and new anonymity properties. We now show how a weakly semantically secure IB-KEM, that is both KwrtA-anonymous and identity-based non-malleable, can be used to build a password-authenticated key exchange.
Description of our Scheme
Our new scheme is generic. It basically consists in generating the session key using this IB-KEM, under the common password as the identity, see Figure 1 . The other party can easily recover the session key. Security notions for semantic security and perfect forward secrecy follow from the (weak) semantic security and anonymity properties of the IB-KEM scheme.
Security Analysis
Communication Model. We assume to have a fixed set of protocol participants, and each of them can be either a client or a server. They are all allowed to participate to several different, possibly concurrent, executions of the key exchange protocol. We model this by allowing each participant an unlimited number of instances able to initiate or participate to executions of the protocol.
In the password-based scenario, the two parties share a low-entropy secret pw which is drawn from a small dictionary Dic. In the following, we assume that the distribution is uniform. More complex distributions could be considered.
We use the security model introduced by Bellare et al. [4] , improved by Abdalla et al. [2] to consider the Real-or-Random security notion instead of the Find-then-Guess. In this model, the adversary A has the entire control of the network, which is formalized by allowing A to ask the following query, Send(U, m), that models A sending the message m to instance U . The adversary A gets back the response U generates in processing the message m according to the protocol. A query Send(U, INIT) initializes the key exchange algorithm, by activating the first player in the protocol.
From the original security model, we suppress the Execute-queries. Even if they were important to model passive attacks vs. active attacks, we consider a stronger security model where the adversary always uses Send-queries, either for simply forwarding a flow generated by a honest user, or for modifying/manufacturing a flow. Thereafter, if the whole transcript of an execution of the protocol turns out to consist of forwarded flows only, this execution is then considered as a passive attack: it is similar to an Execute-query in previous models [4] . If one flow has been modified or manufactured, the session corresponds to an active attack.
As a consequence, in addition to the usual security model with Execute-queries, the adversary can adaptively decide, during an execution of the protocol, whether the session will correspond to a passive attack, or to an active one, and not from the beginning of the session only (as in [18] ). An attack game will consist of a mix of passive and active attacks, in a concurrent manner.
However, as usual, we will be essentially interested in active attacks: q activeC and q activeS will, respectively, denote the number of active attacks in which the adversary played against the client and the server, respectively. We want to show that q activeC + q activeS is an upper-bound on the number of passwords the adversary may have tried.
Security Notions. Two main security notions have been defined for key exchange protocols. The first is the semantic security of the key, which means that the exchanged key is unknown to anybody other than the players. The second one is unilateral or mutual authentication, which means that either one, or both, of the participants actually know the key. In the following, we focus on the semantic security, also known as AKE Security.
The semantic security of the session key is modeled by an additional query Test(U ). Since we are working in the Real-or-Random scenario, this Test-query can be asked as many times as the adversary A wants, but to fresh instances only. The freshness notion captures the intuitive fact that a session key is not "obviously" known to the adversary. More formally an instance is said to be fresh if it has successfully completed execution and 1. Neither it nor its partner was corrupted before the session started 2. or, the attack, on this session, was passive.
Two instances are partners if they run a key exchange protocol together. This is formally modeled by the notion of session ID: the session ID is a string defined from the transcript (usually, it consists of the first flows, sent and received), and two instances are partners if they share the same session IDs.
The Test-query is answered as follows: a (private) coin b has been flipped once for all at the beginning of the attack game, if b = 1 (Real), then the actual session key sk is sent back, if b = 0 (Random), or a random value is returned. Note that for consistency reasons, in the random case, the same random value is sent to partners.
We denote the AKE advantage as the probability that A correctly guesses the value of b with its output b ′ : Adv ake (A) = 2 Pr[b = b ′ ] − 1. The adversary will also have access to the Corrupt-query that leaks the password: it is useful to model the perfect forward secrecy. The latter notion means that a session key remains secret even after the leakage of the long-term secret.
Security Result. For our protocol, we can state the following security result, which proof can be found in the Appendix A.
Theorem 7 (AKE Security). Let us consider an Identity-Based Key Encapsulation Mechanism IBK = (Setup, Extract, Encaps, Decaps) that is weakly semantically secure (selective-ID, chosen-plaintext attacks and no Extract-queries), anonymous, KwrtA-anonymous, and identity-based non-malleable, then our protocol IBK-PAKE, provides semantic security and perfect forward secrecy:
where q active = q activeC + q activeS is the number of active attacks and N is the size of the dictionary.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have first introduced two new security notions for identity-based key encapsulation mechanisms: the first one is an enhancement of the usual anonymity, the second one formalizes a kind on non-malleability, with respect to the recipient identity. Then, we proposed the first scheme that is full-ID semantically secure against chosen-message attacks, and that achieves our new security notions.
We furthermore showed that these new security notions could be useful for identity-based schemes as a tool: we provided a new framework for password-authenticated key exchange, with an identity-based key encapsulation mechanism as a core sub-routine.
A Proof of Theorem 7
This proof goes with a sequence of games, starting from G 0 which represents the real attack game (with a mix of passive and active attacks). In all the games, we focus on the two following events:
-EvS (for semantic security). This event occurs if the adversary correctly guesses the bit b involved in the Test-queries; -EvA (for authentication). This event occurs if an instance accepts a session with no partner (with the adversary).
Our goal is to estimate the probability of event EvS in the real attack game. To this aim, we modify step by step the simulation, to end up with a trivial game the adversary cannot win. We will denote by ∆ n the difference of the probabilities of any event Ev in the game G n and the previous one. Note that such an event must be observable when the distance is computationally bounded, but can be any event when the distance is statistically bounded.
Game G 0 : This is the real attack game. By definition, we have:
Game G 1 : In this game, we simulate Send-queries as shown in Figure 2 . The Test-queries are answered according to the bit b: if b = 1 (Real), then the value sk computed during the simulation is returned; if b = 0 (Random), H ′ 0 (S, C, PK, c) is returned, where H ′ 0 is a private random oracle. This is a truly random value. But since the input is the session ID, thus satisfies the constraint that Test-queries on two partners give the same random value, in the random case. The goal of the following games will be to make the simulations of sk in the real and random cases identical.
Game G 2 :
In a first step, we cancel games in which some collision appears. The former are related to the session IDs, which collisions would be problematic, since it would lead to identical session keys to different sessions, the latter are just for making the security analysis simpler:
-collisions on the partial trancript (S, C, PK, c).
-collisions on the output of H 1 , H 2 and H 0 .
where q H is the number of hash queries, and q session the number of sessions. We furthermore denote by γ an upper-bound on the guessing probabilities of PK and c, and by ℓ the length of the hash function outputs.
Game G 3 : In this game, we deal with sessions in which the adversary remained passive during the first two flows. We denote by q passive the number of such sessions. We will denote by OG the passive flows, for Oracle-Generated. More precisely, in the following, OG(C, n), resp. OG(S, n), means that the n-th flow, received by the client, resp. by the server, has been generated by the simulation: we thus know the random coins, but the adversary does not. The adversary may actively participate to the protocol during the third or fourth flows, and trying to build a valid authenticator in the name of either the server (with AuthS) or the client (with AuthC). Intuitively, since the adversary has no idea about the secret information, MK and K, the probability to build valid authenticators is negligible, even if it would know the password.
We thus modify, in these sessions only (which can be determined before applying the following modifications), the way the authenticators and session keys are computed. More precisely, we replace the public oracles H i (for i = 0, 1, 2) by private ones H ′ i (for i = 0, 1, 2), on truncated inputs: (S, C, PK, c, pw, K) is replaced by the session ID that is public, (S, C, PK, c). We claim that such a modification cannot be noticed by the adversary, under the semantic security of the IB-KEM scheme.
Let us first formally modify the simulation. We thereafter prove the above claim.
We answer to the Send-queries to a C-instance as follows:
-A SendC(C; S, PK) query is processed according to the following rule:
◮Rule C1
(1)
Get (K, c) ← Encaps(PK, pw). Answer with c.
-A SendC(C; S, AuthS)-query is processed according to the following rule:
◮Rule C2
Compute AuthS ′ = H1(C, S, PK, c, pw, K), sk = H0(C, S, PK, c, pw, K), and AuthC = H2(C, S, PK, c, pw, K) Check wether AuthS ′ is equal to AuthS. If the equality holds, accept with session key sk, and answer with AuthC; else reject.
-All the other cases are ignored.
Send-queries to S
We answer to the Send-queries to an S-instance as follows:
-A SendS(S; INIT)-query is processed according to the following rules:
◮Rule S1
Get (PK, MK) ← Setup(1 λ ). Answer with PK. -A SendS(S; C, c)-query is processed according to the following rules:
◮Rule S2
Get usk ← Extract(MK, pw); Decapsulate the key, K ′ ← Decaps(usk, c); Compute AuthS = H1(C, S, PK, c, pw, K ′ ). Answer with AuthS.
-A SendS(S; C, AuthC)-query is processed according to the following rules:
◮Rule S3
Compute AuthC ′ = H2(C, S, PK, c, pw, K ′ ), and sk = H0(C, S, PK, c, pw, K ′ ) Check wether AuthC ′ is equal to AuthC. If the equality holds, accept with session key sk, and terminate; Else reject. -All the other cases are ignored.
H
For a hash-query Hn(q) (resp. H ′ n (q)), such that a record (n, q, r) appears in ΛH 1 (resp. Λ H ′ ), the answer is r. Otherwise one chooses a random element r in the appropriate range, answers with it, and adds the record (n, q, r) to ΛH 1 (resp. Λ H ′ ). 
Games G 3 and G 2 are identical except if the adversary remarks the use of private oracles. But this is possible if and only if A asks queries to H i on some transcripts (S, C, PK, c), with the appropriate pair (pw, K). We call this event AskHP (for Passive, since the adversary was passive during the first flows). In order to estimate the probability of event AskHP, we define an auxiliary game that fills the gap between the two games G 2 and G 3 with the semantic security of the IB-KEM scheme: if A can distinguish both executions, then we can construct a selective-ID, chosen-plaintext adversary against the semantic security of the underlying IB-KEM scheme, without any Extract-query (our previous weak semantic security notion).
We thus suppose by contradiction that there exists A ′ that can distinguish the games G 3 and G 2 , with non-negligeable advantage. We construct an adversary B against the semantic security of the IB-KEM scheme.
Game G 2.1 : We make the modification, from game G 2 , for one session only, the i-th one, for i chosen between 1 and q session , before any corruption:
-if this is the i-th session, let the challenger run Setup(1 λ ), with the target identity pw, to get PK; -else, get (PK, MK) ← Setup(1 λ ).
◮Rule C1 (2.1) -if this is the i-th session and OG(C, 1), ask for pw to the challenger, that answers with a pair (K, c)
◮Rule S2 (2.1) -if this is the i-th session, and OG(C, 1) ∧ OG(S, 2), compute AuthS = H 1 (S, C, PK, c, pw, K).
Note that in the real case (d = 1), we are exactly as in game G 2 . In the random case, it is clear that the probability to ask H i on appropriate K for this session is negligible (upper-bounded by γq H , where γ is an upper-bound on the guessing probability for K) since no information leaks about it.
In this game, we just formally modify the simulation, but without any modification to the view of the adversary, since we take a random ciphertext c according to the appropriate distribution, that may depend on the password. Our goal will then be to make it independent of the password, when there is no corruption (the flag Corrupt specifies whether the adversary got the password or not with a corruption query). We define two distributions C PK and C PK,pw as follows:
C PK = {Encrypt(PK, pw, m) | m ∈ M}, and C PK,pw = {Encrypt(PK, pw, m) | m ∈ M, pw ∈ Dic}.
◮Rule C1 (4) -if ¬Corrupt ∧ OG(C, 1), get c ← C PK,pw ; -else, get (K, c) ← Encaps(PK, pw).
Since K is not needed in the later flows, in the case that OG(C, 1) and OG(S, 2), this simulation does not change anything, ∆ 4 = 0.
Game G 5 : We now make the simulation of the client, that receives an oracle-generated public key PK, independent of the password. Our new game will be indistinguishable from the previous one, under the KwrtA-anonymity of the underlying IB-KEM scheme.
The distance between G 5 and G 4 is negligible except if A is able to distinguish the distribution C PK from the distribution of C PK,pw , where pw is possibly known to the adversary, but PK has been generated by a trusted party. Using a classical hybrid sequence of games, we can easily show that
Note that in the previous hybrid sequence of games (in game G 2.1 ), we had to start the simulation specific to the i-th hybrid game before knowing whether it would be a passive session or not, hence the factor q session . In this hybrid sequence, the modification starts only when we already know that it is a passive session, hence the factor q passive only.
Game G 6 : In this game, we consider attacks in which the adversary starts to be active in the second flow: it chooses the ciphertext c. We will show that there is a small chance to send the correct authenticator AuthC, except if the correct password has been guessed, and used in the ciphertext c: at most one password can be tested. More precisely, we replace the hash oracles H i by private ones as soon as PK has been oracle-generated. C, PK, c, pw, K) Games G 6 and G 5 are identical except if the adversary remarks the use of the private oracles H ′ i in sessions in which he chooses the ciphertext c, but not PK. Such an event happens only if A asks the H queries on some transcript (S, C, PK, c) for the appropriate pair (pw, K), i.e. such that K = Decaps(pw, c), for the password. This means that there exists at least one password pw such that (S, C, PK, c, pw, K) ∈ Λ H 1 , and K = Decaps(pw, c). We call this event AskHS 6 . To make our analysis clearer, we distinguish the two following cases:
-for all the sessions (S, C, PK, c), where c is chosen by the adversary, there is at most one password π such that (S, C, PK, c, π, K = Decaps(π, c)) ∈ Λ H 1 . We call this event AskHSU 6 . If it occurs, then at most one password is tested by active attacks against the server. Our goal is to show that:
-for some session (S, C, PK, c), there are at least two passwords π 1 , π 2 such that (S, C, PK, c, π i , K i = Decaps(π i , c)) ∈ Λ H 1 . We call this event AskHSM. If this event occurs, then A can construct a tuple {c, (π 1 , K 1 ), (π 2 , K 2 )} such that K 1 = Decaps(π 1 , c) and K 2 = Decaps(π 2 , c), which contradicts the identity-based non-malleability of the underlying IB-KEM scheme:
Hence, 
Game G 7 :
In this game, we now consider the active attacks against the client, from the beginning of the session: the adversary sends the first flow, it thus controls PK, and possibly knows MK. As in game G 5 , we want to make the generation of the ciphertext c independent of the password, even in this case. However, we have to make the following computations independent of K first: we replace the hash oracles by private oracles in all the sessions where nobody is corrupted:
◮Rule S3 (7) -if ¬Corrupt, compute AuthC = H ′ 2 (S, C, PK, c) and sk = H ′ 0 (S, C, PK, c); -else, compute AuthC ′ = H 2 (S, C, PK, c, pw, K ′ ) and sk = H 0 (S, C, PK, c, pw, K ′ ).
Games G 7 and G 6 are identical except when PK is not oracle-generated: all public oracles are replaced by private ones. A can see the difference only if it asks H 1 on some transcript (S, C, PK, c) for an appropriate pair (pw, K), such that K = Decaps(pw, c) in Λ H 1 . This query is required for a valid authenticator AuthS.
As we have canceled executions with collisions from game G 2 , for each authenticator AuthS sent by the adversary, there is at most one tuple (S, C, PK, c, pw, K) such that AuthS = H 1 (S, C, PK, c, pw, K). Such an event is denoted AskHC.
Game G 8 : Since we still use the password for defining the distribution of c, we cannot say anything about the probability of events AskHC and AskHSU. So, as in game G 5 , we now make the generation of the ciphertext c independent of the password, even in the case that PK is generated by the adversary. Since the adversary chooses the public key PK, the distance now involves the KwrtA-anonymity of the IB-KEM scheme:
The distance between G 8 and G 7 is negligible except if A is able to distinguish the distribution C PK from the distribution of C PK,pw , where pw is possibly known to the adversary, and PK has been chosen by the adversary. Using a similar hybrid sequence of games as done in Game G 5 , but when the adversary knows MK, we can easily show that
Game G 9 : First note that unless a corruption happened, the authenticators and the session keys are computed using the private oracles, without the password in the input. Note that the password is no longer used in any other stage of the simulation unless there has been a corruption:
-the server generates public parameters, -the client generates a ciphertext in C PK .
We can thus choose the password at the very end only, or when a corruption happens: ∆ 9 = 0. And then, we can evaluate whether events AskHC or AskHSU were raised or not:
-Event AskHSU means that for each session (S, C, PK, c), where c is chosen by the adversary (active attack against the server, there is at most one appropriate pair (pw, K). And thus, only one password can raise this event for each session against the server:
Pr[AskHSU 9 ] ≤ q activeS N -Event AskHC means that A sent an authenticator AuthS (active attack against the client) that includes the good password. But only one value for the password can raise this event for each session against the client, since collisions on H 1 were canceled:
Game G 10 :
In order to conclude, we need to replace hash oracles by the private ones (at least for the session keys) for all the sessions that are fresh. We already dealt with all the cases, except when the password has been corrupted. In the security model, we also included passive sessions as fresh sessions, even when players are corrupted.
◮Rule S2 (10) -if ¬Corrupt ∨ (OG(C, 1) ∧ OG(S, 2)), compute AuthS = H ′ 1 (S, C, PK, c); -else, get usk ← Extract(MK, pw); decrypt the ciphertext, K ′ ← Decaps(usk, c);
Games G 10 and G 9 are identical except when the two first flows are oracle-generated and the password is compromised: we replace the hash oracles by private oracles. But exactly as in game G 3 , the distinction relies on the weak semantic security of the IB-KEM scheme:
Since in the latter game, all the session keys are computed with a private oracle, there is no difference between the real and the random cases for the Test-queries:
B Analysis in the Generic Model

B.1 The Common co-CDH-Problem
Let us first recall the Common co-CDH-Problem: given g, h ∈ G, and V ∈ G T , output c ∈ G, k 0 = k 1 ∈ Z p , and K 0 , K 1 ∈ G T such that:
We define the success of A in breaking the Common-co-CDH G,ê -Problem, denoted by Succ
Theorem 8. Let A be an adversary that makes at most q group operation queries (internal laws in G or G T , or pairing operations). On inputs g, h ∈ G, and V ∈ G T , the probability that A outputs a solution
Proof. Let A be an adversary against the Common co-CDH-Problem. We define a simulator B that emulates the group oracles: B maintains two lists L 1 and L T of polynomials
The entries ξ 1,i , ξ T,i are set to be distinct random strings and are used to represent elements in G and G T respectively. At the beginning of the game, B just sets two polynomials F 1,0 = 1 and F 1,1 = x 1 , which refer to a generator g and a random element h = g x 1 in G, respectively. Similarly, B defines two polynomials F T,0 = 1 and F T,1 = X 1 associated to elements U = e(g, g) and V = e(g, g) X 1 in G T . For any oracle query, B updates the lists L 1 and L T :
-Group Operation in G: when A asks for the addition of two elements in G, it gives two representations ξ i and ξ j . Theses two strings are either associated to the polynomials F 1,i , F 1,j ((F 1,i , ξ i ) and (F 1,j , ξ j ) are in L 1 ) or one defines a new variable x 1,i and set F 1,i = x 1,i associated to ξ i and thus adds (F 1,i , ξ i ) to L 1 (or for index j). We thus assume that (F 1,i , ξ i ) and (F 1,j , ξ j ) are in L 1 . Then, it computes the sum of the polynomials, F 1,k = F 1,i + F 1,j . If the resulting polynomial F 1,k already appears in the list for some index l ≤ t 1 , then it sets ξ 1,k ← ξ 1,l , else it chooses a new random string in {0, 1} log 2 p for ξ 1,k . Note that group operations in G result in multivariate polynomials of degree at most one in variables x 1 , · · · , x m , for some integer m ≤ t 1 . -Pairing: when A requests a pairing query. It gives two representations ξ 1,i and ξ 1,j . As above, by possibly setting the undefined elements, we can assume that (F 1,i , ξ i ) and (F 1,j , ξ j ) are in L 1 . Then, B computes the product of the polynomials, F T,k = F 1,i · F 1,j . If the resulting polynomial already appears in the list for some index l ≤ t T , then it sets ξ T,k ← ξ T,l , else it chooses a new random string ξ T,k in {0, 1} log 2 p for F T,k . Since we know that polynomials in L 1 are of degree 1 in the variables x 1 , . . ., the polynomials we create with this simulation are of degree 2 in the same variables. -Group operation in G T : when A asks for the addition of two elements in G T , it gives two representations ξ i and ξ j . As above, by possibly setting the undefined elements (and new variables X i or X j ), we can assume that (F T,i , ξ i ) and (F T,j , ξ j ) are in L T . Then, B computes the sum of the polynomials, F T,k = F T,i + F T,j . If the resulting polynomial already appears in the list for some index l ≤ t T , then it sets ξ T,k ← ξ T,l , else it chooses a new random string ξ T,k in {0, 1} log 2 p for F T,k .
In the previous simulation, we created polynomials in L T of degree 2 in the variables x 1 , . . .. We can thus add these polynomials: they remain polynomials of degree 2 in the variables x 1 , . . .. We can also add these polynomials with the initial polynomials F T,1 , F T,2 , . . . and the new variables X i : polynomials of degree 1 in the variables X 1 , . . ..
As a consequence, any polynomial F in L T can be split in two polynomials A ∈ Z p [x 1 , · · · , x m ] (of degree 2) and B ∈ Z p [X 1 , · · · , X n ] (of degree 1) such that F = A + B.
Note that for each group operation query, the oracle adds at most three new variables in the list. Thus if q is the number of queries we have t 1 + t T ≤ 3q + 4.
To evaluate the success of any adversary in distinguishing the above simulation from the real oracles, one has to define the event raised in case of deviation. This happens if the evaluations of two polynomials on the initial vector (x 1 , . . . , X 1 , . . .) refer to the same value: the oracles would output the same representation whereas our simulation just compares the polynomials and would thus output different representations. More precisely, the simulation can be detected if there exists a pair of polynomials (F, F ′ ) such that for a random choice of x 1 , · · · , x n , X 1 , · · · , X m in Z p , F (x 1 , · · · , x n , X 1 , · · · , X m ) = F ′ (x 1 , · · · , x n , X 1 , · · · , X m ) whereas F = F ′ .
Since polynomials are of degree at most 2, this can happen with probability less than 2/p for each pair of polynomials: afterueries, the probability that the adversary distinguishes the two executions is bounded by 2 · (3q + 4) 2 /p.
Unless the adversary A detects the simulation, it terminates by outputting a tuple (k 0 , k 1 , ξ T 0 , ξ T 1 , ξ 1 c ), where k 0 , k 1 are in Z p . B retrieves, in the list, the polynomials associated to ξ T 0 (representation of K 0 ), ξ T 1 (representation of K 1 ) and ξ 1 c (representation of c), if they exist. Otherwise, as before, it adds new variables. Let thus F 0 , F 1 and P be the polynomials associated to ξ T 0 , ξ T 1 and ξ 1 c respectively: P ∈ Z p [x 1 , x 2 , · · · , x m ] of degree one, and F i ∈ Z p [x 1 , · · · , x m , X 1 , · · · , X n ] of degree two. More precisely, as noted before, we can split F i = A i + B i , with A i ∈ Z p [x 1 , x 2 , · · · , x m ] of degree two, and B i ∈ Z p [X 1 , · · · , X n ] of degree one.
If A is successful, this means that for some β i , we have:
The equalities above implies the following ones:
After substitution, we obtain (A i (x 1 , x 2 , · · · , x m ) + B i (X 1 , · · · , X n )) · P (x 1 , x 2 , · · · , x m ) − (1 + k i x 1 ) · X 1 = 0.
At this point, either the success probability of the adversary is negligible (the above polynomial is non-zero), or A i (x 1 , x 2 , · · · , x m ) = 0, B i (X 1 , X 2 , · · · , X n ) = β i · X 1 where β i is now known to be a constant. Since P is a common polynomial, one gets
Again, either the success probability of the adversary is negligible (the above polynomial is non-zero), or β 0 = β 1 and k 1 β 0 = k 0 β 1 , which implies that k 0 = k 1 . However, a successful attack does not allow that, which concludes the proof.
C Analysis of the Successive-Power Problem.
The Successive-Power problem is the following: given g, g x , g y , g z , and g z/x , g z/x 2 , . . . , g z/x q , as well as V , from some V ∈ G T , where q is a parameter, decide whether V =ê(g, g) xyz , or V is a random element of G T .
